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Intoduction
The topic about relation between human capital
and trade patterns has been explored by many au-
thors. Human capital can be produced through
various channels. Education is one of the chan-
nels to produce human capital. On the other hand,
education can be provided by public sector or pri-
vate sector. In fact, there are some countries
where education is mainly provided by govern-
ment whereas some countries are the opposite. 
If human capital is provided by public sector or
government, it is interesting to refer some studies
in the literature of international trade where pub-
lic service or public good is incorporated. Abe
(1990) examines how the difference in the level
of public input supplied by the government af-
fects the trade patterns between the countries.
Some other studies are also remarkable such as
Manning McMillan (1979), Tawada and Abe
(1984), Okamoto (1985), and Ishizawa (1988) al-
so examine trade patterns in the economy with the
public intermediate good. The important role of
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Abstract
We examine the trade patterns using traditional Ricardo-Viner model, but also consid-
er one of the sectoral-specific factor as human capital which will be produced under edu-
cation. The education service in a country may be provided by government or private
sector. We will show that a country with a publicly provided education will export the
good which is produced by using the human capital.
要　約
近年、国立大学の独立法人化が進み、従来の国公立大学も私立大学としての特徴が目立
つようになってきた。こうした状況の中で、国際競争力が受ける影響について、理論的な
枠組で分析してみる。特に、貿易パターンへの影響を調べるために、われわれは、人的資
本の概念が導入された伝統的な特殊要素モデルを用いて、極端な二つのケースを検討して
みる。つまり、国立大学しか存在しない国と私立大学しか存在しない国における、最終財
の国内相対価格を調べ、最後に貿易パターンを導出する。結果的に、国立大学だけ存在す
る国が、人的資本を使って生産される最終財を、私立大学だけ存在する国に輸出すること
が示される。
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government which is to provide public input to
private sector is emphasized in those studies.
There are also some authors consider the public
input as education such as Wong and Yip (1999)
study the effects on growth, welfare, and income
distribution. 
However, in the literature of international
trade, the comparations between publicly provid-
ed service and privately provided service, espe-
cially where human capital is dealt with, have not
been explored sufficiently. The issue of trade pat-
terns between publicly provided education econo-
my and privately provided education economy
will be examined in this paper. 
On the other hand, Findlay and Kierzkowski
(1983) construct a model with two kinds of individ-
ual with equal lifetime income in terms of present
value which is based on the standard Heckscher-
Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model.１ In this paper,
we follow the basic idea of Findlay-Kierzkowski
(1983) and apply the standard Ricardo-Viner
(RV) model instead of HOS model. 
The purpose of this paper is to study the trade
equilibrium between the public education country
and the private education country. We will show
that a country with publicly provided education
will export final good which is produced by using
human capital and import the other final good
which is produced by not using human capital,
while a country with privately provided education
does the opposite. In order to make our compara-
tion more tractable, we will simplify all the pro-
duction function not only in standard form but al-
so in more numerically. Since the basic model we
apply here is RV model, analogous production
functions are also allowed in this paper.２
In the next section we will simply show the
standard RV model, and then the formation of hu-
man capital under publicly provided education
and privately provided education. The main re-
sults are shown in section 3 and the comparations
are presented in section 4. Concluding remarks
are given in the final section. 
The Model
（1）The Standard Ricardo-Viner model
We consider a three-sector (2 final good sectors
and 1 education sector), two-primary-factor (un-
skilled labor and capital)framework. Final good
sectors are private sectors while education sector
may be public sector or private sector. Education
sector produces human capital which will be used
together with unskilled labor as inputs in one of
the final good sectors, say, sector 1, to produce
the final goods, say, good 1. Good 2 is produced
in sector 2 using the primary-factor, that is, un-
skilled labor and capital. On the other hand, hu-
man capital is produced using unskilled labor and
the human capital itself in the education sector.
Unskilled labor is mobile among the private sec-
tors and capital is immobile among sectors,
whereas human capital is mobile between only
sector 1 and education sector. 
First, we will show the basic RV model. As-
sume that the production functions of the final
goods are expressed as
,X L H1 1= (1)
,X L K2 2= (2)
where X1, X2, L1, L2, K and H denote good 1, good
2, unskilled labor employed in sector 1 and sector
2, capital and human capital, respectively. 
Full employment conditions of the primary-fac-
tor are expressed as
,L L L1 2+ = (3)
,K K= (4)
where K is the fixed endowment of capital while
L is the supply of total unskilled labor and is en-
dogenously determined which is different from
the standard RV model. 
The basic RV model differs also from our mod-
el in the full employment condition of human
capital. Assume also that the production function
of the education sector is expressed as 
,H H UE E
～
= (5)
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,H H H E
～
= - (6)
where H
～
is the gross output of human capital and
HE is the input of human capital itself, or we can
refer it as “educator” in the education sector.３ UE
represents those who have chosen not to be un-
skilled labor but to be students. H denotes the net
output of the human capital. In other words, H
～
is
the total supply of human capital which can be
employed in education sector as educator (HE) or
in the sector 1 to produce good 1. For simplicity,
we also assume that the domestic capital stock is
owned by all individuals and there is perfectly
equality in distribution of the capital stock.４
Then, in each period, each individual receives
rK/2N equally where r is the factor price of the
capital and 2N is amount of population. 
At the present moment, suppose H is assumed
to be perfect inelastic, then we can solve the basic
system by using the unit cost functions. Let WH
and WL denote the factor prices of human capital
and unskilled labor, respectively.５ The final goods
market equilibrium conditions will be given by
,W W P2 H L = (7)
,rW2 1L = (8)
where good 2 serves as the numeraire, and P is
the relative price of good 1 in terms of the nu-
meraire. Full employment conditions are ex-
pressed as
,X
W
W
X W
r
L
L
H
L
1 2+ = (9)
,X
W
W
H
H
L
1 = (10)
.X r
W
KL2 = (11)
Given P, K, L, H, α and β, we can solve for WL,
WH, r, X1 and X2 from equations (7) to (11). This
is only the familiar basic RV model which is
much simpler than what we are going to extend. 
Now, we have to introduce the basic idea of
Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983) to complete our
model. In the economy, we have 2 generations at
each period. At each period, N individuals are
born but also N individuals die, it ends up a sta-
tionary population at each period. For simplicity,
we assume that each individual lives for only 2
periods. Each individual can choose to be educat-
ed at period 1 then earn his or her income as hu-
man capital at period 2, or choose to start working
as unskilled labor to earn his or her income at pe-
riod 1 and period 2. Either way, their lifetime in-
come must be the same due to the arbitrary condi-
tions. Let UE and UL denote the individuals who
choose to be educated and to be unskilled labor,
respectively. 
The population at each period is expressed as 
,N U U2 2 E L= +_ i (12)
it follows that the total supply of unskilled labor
is expressed as
.L U2 L= (13)
The next step is to clarify the differences be-
tween the publicly provided education and the
privately provided education. 
（2）Publicly provided education
In this subsection, we assume that the education is
provided by the government with free of charge.
The government imposes income tax to finance
the provision of education. The opportunity cost,
which is the income of unskilled labor earned at
period 1 and period 2, in terms of present value,６
is expressed as
,W
W
1
1
L
L- +
+
x t_ di n
where τ and ρ are, income tax rate and fixed in-
terest rate, respectively. Since the education ser-
vice is free of charge, the total cost of education is
only the opportunity cost, which is the income of
unskilled labor earned at period 1 and period 2.
The gross benefit of education to an individual, in
terms of present value, is expressed as
.
U
W H U
1
1
1
E
H E E
: :-
+
x t_ i
Note that W HH
～
represents the total income of the
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whole supply of human capital at period 2 with-
out tax being imposed, that is, when τ is zero.７
In the equilibrium, UE must be determined with
equalizing the opportunity cost and the gross ben-
efit of human capital in terms of present value,
thus we must have
.
W
W
U
H U
2H
L
E
E E
=
+ t_ i (14)
The government ’s budget constraint will be
given by
,W H W H H W L rKH E H E L= + + +x _ i8 B (15)
where the LHS is the tuition received by all edu-
cators while the RHS represents the tax revenue
collected by imposing the same income tax rate to
all individuals. 
Assume that the government chooses HE to
maximize H , hence the maximization problem is
.max H
H E
Considering the equations (5) and (6), the solu-
tion for the problem is
.
U
H
4
1
E
E = (16)
Before we see the equilibrium in the case of
publicly provided education, we depict the case of
privately provided education in the next subsec-
tion. 
（3）Privately provided education
In this subsection we assume that there is no edu-
cation is provided by government which is free of
charge, so each individual has to “buy ”the educa-
tion service. We also assume that each educator
gets exactly the factor price of human capital as
his or her wage. It follows that tuition has to be
paid by an individual is WEHE/UE. The opportuni-
ty cost will be the income of unskilled labor
earned at period 1 and period 2. Hence the total
cost of education will be given by
.
U
W H
W
W
1E
E E
L
L+ +
+ t
The gross benefit of education to an individual
is expressed as
.
U
W H U
1
1
E
H E E
:
+ t
In the equilibrium, the gross benefit must be
equal to the total cost of education, thus we must
have
.
W
W
U
H U H
2
1
H
L
E
E E E
=
+
- +
t
t
_
_
i
i (17)
As long as the private education sector is per-
fect competitive, we must have
,W
H
H U
WH
E
E E
H: 2
2
= (18)
which is the familiar first order condition, only is
WH in the LHS represents the price of the human
capital which can be “purchased ”by sector 1,
whereas the other one in the RHS represents the
factor price of the educator. Hence we obtain the
exactly same condition in the case of publicly
provided education, which is expressed in the
equation (16). 
Public Provision VS Private
Provision
In this section, we are going to compare the equi-
librium between the case of publicly provided ed-
ucation and the case of privately provided educa-
tion. To see the comparation more clearly and
without getting confused, we distinguish the nota-
tion of endogenous variables between the two
cases. For example, WLg will represent the factor
price of unskilled labor in the case of publicly
provided education whereas WLp will represent
that in the case of privately provided education. 
After all, we can use 12 equations to solve for
the economy with publicly provided education,
that is, from equations (5) to (13) and (14) to (16)
to solve simultaneously for 12 variables which are
WL
g
, WH
g
, r g , X g1 , X
g
2 , L
g
, H g , H E
g
, H g
～
, U E
g
, U L
g and
τ. On the other hand, we can also use 11 equa-
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tions to solve for the economy with privately pro-
vided education, that is, from equations (5) to
(13), (16) and (17) to solve for 11 variables which
are WL
p
, WH
p
, r p , X p1 , X
p
2 , L
p
, H p , H E
p
, H p
～
, U E
p
,
and U Lp . 
Let us solve for WL, WH, r, X1 and X2 in concrete
form given P, K, L and H . From equations (7) to
(11), we have the conventional RV model solu-
tions which are expressed as
,
W
W
HP K
LP
L
H
2
2
=
+
(19)
,
W
r
HP K
L
L
2= +
(20)
,X
HP K
LP
1 2
2
=
+
(21)
.X
HP K
L
2 2= +
(22)
The four equations above are common to both the
cases of publicly provided education and private-
ly provided education. The next thing we have to
do is to solve H and L in concrete form. 
（1）Publicly provided education equilibri-
um
From here we start using the distinguished nota-
tion to avoid confusion. The endogenously deter-
mined variables are in the form with superscript
of “g” as referred previously. Rewrite the equa-
tion (16), we have
.
U
H
4
1
E
g
E
g
= (16')
From equations (16'), (5) and (6), we obtain
,H U
4
1g
E
g:= (23)
.H Hg E
g= (24)
Substitute equations (5), (16') and (19) into
equation (14) and rearrange it, we have
.L
P
HP K2 2g 2
2
:= + +t_ i (25)
Substitute equations (12), (13) and (23) into equa-
tion (25), we obtain
,U
P
NP K
6
4 2E
g
2
2=
+
- +
t
t_ _i i8 B (26)
where / <K NP2 12+ t_ i is assumed.８ Substitute
equation (26) into equations (23) and (24), we
have,
.H H
P
NP K
6
4 2g E
g
2
2= =
+
- +
t
t_ _i i8 B (27)
Substitute equation (27) into equation (25), we
obtain
.L
P
NP K
6
2 2 4
g
2
2
=
+
+ +
t
t
_
_ _
i
i i (28)
Now we can solve the equations from (19) to
(22) in concrete form. Substituting equation (27)
and (28) into them, we obtain
,
W
W
2 2
L
g
H
g
= + t_ i (19')
,
W
r
P
2 2
L
g
g
2=
+ t_ i (20')
,X
P
NP K
6
2 2 2
g
1 2
2:
=
+
+ - +
t
t t
_
_ _`
i
i i j
(21')
.X
P
K2 2
g
2
:
=
+ t_ i (22')
In particular, we can also solve for WLg , WHg , r g
and X g1 , X g2 . Rearrange equation (19') and substi-
tute it into equation (7), and then substitute WLg in-
to equation (20'), we have 
,W P
2 2 2
L
g =
+ t_ i (29)
,W
P
2
2 2
H
g
:
=
+ t_ i (30)
.r
P2
2 2
g =
+ t_ i (31)
On the other hand, from equations (21') and (22'),
we obtain 
.
X
X
KP
NP K
6
2
g
g
2
1
2
=
+
- +
t
t
_
_
i
i (32)
It is interesting to see that WLg/P and WHg/P are
alway constant as well as WHg /WLg . The magnifica-
tion effect of P on WHg /WLg vanishes in our model
which is different from the standard RV model. 
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（2）Privately provided education equilibri-
um
In this subsection we will do almost the same sub-
stitutions as done in the previous subsection, only
we use equation (17) instead of equation (14).
Moreover, we use the superscript notations with
“p” instead of “g” to distinguish from the case of
publicly provided education. 
Rewrite equation (16), we have
.
U
H
4
1
E
p
E
p
= (16'')
From equations (16''), (5) and (6), we obtain
,H U
4
1p
E
p:= (33)
.H Hp E
p= (34)
Substitute equations (5), (16'') and (19) into
equation (17) and rearrange it, we have
.L
P
HP K
1
4 2
p
2
2
:=
-
+ +
t
t_ i (35)
Substitute equations (12), (13) and (33) into equa-
tion (35), we obtain 
,U
P
N P K
4
2 1 2 2
E
p
2
2
=
-
- - +
t
t t
_
_ _
i
i i8 B
(36)
where / <K NP2 2 1 12+ -t t_ _i i is assumed.９
Substitute equation (36) into equations (33) and
(34), we have
.H H
P
N P K
2 4
1 2 2
p
E
p
2
2
= =
-
- - +
t
t t
_
_ _
i
i i (37)
Substitute equation (37) into equation (35), we
obtain 
.L
P
NP K
4
2 2 4
p
2
2
=
-
+ +
t
t
_
_ _
i
i i (38)
Now we can solve the equations from (19) to
(22) in concrete form for the case of privately
provided education. Substituting equation (37)
and (38) into them, we obtain
,
W
W
1
4 2
L
p
H
p
=
-
+
t
t_ i (19'')
,
W
r
P1
4 2
L
p
p
2
=
-
+
t
t
_
_
i
i (20'')
,X
P
NP K
1
2
4
1 2 2
p
1 2
2
:=
-
+
-
- - +
t
t
t
t t
_
_ _
i
i i (21'')
.X
P
K2
1
2p
2 := -
+
t
t (22'')
As what have been done in the previous sub-
section, we can also solve for WLp , WHp , r p , X P1 /
X P2 . Rearrange equation (19 and substitute it into
equation (7), and then substitute WLp into equation
(20'), we have 
,W P
2
1
4L
p :=
+
-
t
t (39)
,W P
1
2
H
p :=
-
+
t
t (40)
.r
P1
2 1p :=
-
+
t
t (41)
On the other hand, from equations (21'') and
(22''), we obtain
.
X
X
KP
NP K
2 4
1 2 2
p
p
2
1
2
=
-
- - +
t
t t
_
_ _
i
i i (42)
Comparations
In this section, let us make some comparations
between the case of publicly provided education
and the case of privately provided education
which can be shown in table 1. 
Factor Supplies Factor Prices              Output
>U UE
g
E
p / < /W W W WH
g
L
g
H
p
L
p ?X Xg p1 1
>H HE
g
E
p / < /r W r Wg L
g p
L
p <X Xg p2 2
>H Hg p <W WH
g
H
p / > /X X X Xg g p p1 2 1 2
<L Lg p <r rg p
>W WL
g
L
p
Table 1: The difference between X g1 and X p1 depends on
the interest rate (or time preference rate), as well as the
population, capital endowment and relative price of final
goods. X g1 is probably larger than  X p1 if K/NP is not too
small as well as ρ. 
It is interesting to see that, although /W WHg Lg is
smaller than /W WHp Lp , more individuals are will-
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ing to become UE in the case of publicly provided
education than in the case of privately provided
education. This can be explained as follows. In
the case of public provision, although the gross
benefit of becoming a member of human capital
is smaller than in the case of private provision,
the “total cost” of education is much smaller in
the case of public provision than in the case of
private provision. This is mainly because the edu-
cation service is free of charge under public pro-
vision. As a result, it makes the publicly provided
education more attractive compared to the pri-
vately provided education and more individuals
are willing to become human capital. Since the
supply of human capital is larger in the public
provision economy, factor prices of specific fac-
tors are smaller whereas factor price of mobile
factor is larger compared to those in the private
provision economy. 
We should notice that not only factor prices of
specific factors are smaller in the publicly provi-
sion economy, but also income tax are imposed.
Hence individuals of human capital face two
kinds of negative effect and may even be worse
off even though education is provided by free of
charge. However, whether they will be better off
or worse off, we should compare their lifetime in-
come. In terms of lifetime income, not only capi-
tal income, but also tuition as well as income tax
should be taken into account. Regardless of un-
skilled labor or human capital, the lifetime in-
come of all individuals in a country must be equal
in equilibrium, hence it is just convenient to com-
pare only the lifetime income of unskilled labor
between countries. The difference can easily be
obtained but it is indetermined and depends on
the interest rate, population, capital endowment
and relative price of final goods. However, our
aim in this paper is to focus on the trade patterns,
so we just leave this argument out from this pa-
per. 
On the other hand, the supply of unskilled labor
must decrease in the public provision case due to
the increase in UE. What happens to the output of
final goods? This can just simply be predicted
through the mechanism which has been explained
and so familiar in the traditional RV model, that
is, X2 must decrease whereas X1 may increase or
decrease since H increases but L decreases. In this
paper, it depends on the population, capital en-
dowment and relative price of final goods. X1 is
likely to increase if K/NP is not too small as well
as ρ. In any case, X1/X2 definitely declines and
does not depend on other variables in this paper.
This point is more important in the context of in-
ternational trade as long as we are focus on the
trade pattern between two countries. This can be
easily proved by substracting equation (42) from
equation (32). 
Let us see what happens to trade pattern be-
tween the public provision economy and private
provision economy. Since from equations (32)
and (42) we know that both /X Xg g1 2 and /X Xp p1 2 are
increasing functions of P, if free trade is allowed,
we can conclude as
Proposition 1
Assume that there are two countries with
identical preferences, technology, population
and capital endowments. The country with
publicly provided education exports final
goods which is produced by using human
capital and imports final goods which is not
produced by using human capital, while the
country with privately provided education
does the opposite. 
This proposition mainly depends on the amount
of human capital supplies in both countries as
shown in the traditional RV model. What we have
done is to show that a country with publicly pro-
vided education will generate more human capital
than that in a country with privately provided ed-
ucation. As a result, a country with publicly pro-
vided education has a comparative advantage in
the production of final good 1 and has a compara-
tive disadvantage in the production of final good
2. Conversely, a country with privately provided
education does the opposite. 
Conclusion
This paper has mainly examined the trade patterns
between a country with publicly provided educa-
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tion and a country with privately provided educa-
tion. 
Besides the trade patterns, we have also shown
other important results such as the comparation
between factor prices. In fact, there is nothing to
say that a country which has a comparative ad-
vantage in the production of final good produced
by human capital is better off or not. Since we can
see from our results, factor price of human capital
is lower and income tax is imposed as well in the
country which exports the final good produced by
human capital, despite the free education. This is
not surprising, since it is also valid in the standard
RV model when human capital endowment is
abundant. On the other hand, the factor price of
capital which is perfectly equally distributed and
owned by all individuals decreases as well in the
country with publicly provided education. More-
over, each individual still has to pay the income
tax which will be used to fnance the cost of edu-
cation. On the contrary, although individuals of
human capital get higher factor price and income
tax is not imposed in the private provision econo-
my but they have to pay tuition for the education,
so they are not necessary better off as well. The
comparations of the welfare between the two
countries can easily be examined, but we would
rather focus only on the trade patterns. 
Another point should also be noticed is that
quality among individuals of human capital is
identical not only just within a country but also
between countries. Hence if factor mobility is al-
lowed as well as free trade, capital and human
capital will move from the country with publicly
provided education to the country with privately
provided education, since individuals of human
capital must earn more in the country with pri-
vately provided education. 
How will unskilled labor move between coun-
tries then? Since the difference of unskilled labor
income can be earned is indetermined and the an-
swer depends on the exogenous variables such as
population and capital endowment. 
The examination about whether a country will
end up as a country with publicly provided coun-
try or privately provided country, and how trade
patterns are eventually determined will be more
interesting. For example, to examine whether a
country with larger size or smaller size of K/N
will prefer to be public provision country and as a
result has a comparative in production of final
good produced by using human capital. In addi-
tion, general forms of production functions may
be more appropriate for our analysis in this paper. 
All of this may be considered in the future re-
search. 
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Notes
１．Mayer (1982), shows factor quality considerations
into Heckscher-Ohlin framework and examines the
importance of factors skills in determining a coun-
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try’s production pattern and income distribution. 
２．Production functions of good cannot be the same
in Hechscher Ohlin framework. 
３．HE will be chosen to maximize H
～
by the govern-
ment in the case of publicly provided education or
by the individuals in the case of privately provided
education. We will show this later. 
４．Many studies assume this, for example, see Gupta
(1994). 
５．The unit cost functions are defined as
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６．Note that this is not an unskilled labor ’s lifetime
income, since he or she receives rK/2N as well. 
７．It does not matter whether an individual of the hu-
man capital is employed in the sector 1 or in the edu-
cation sector as an educator, he or she will get only
the same factor price of human capital in terms of
present value. This also applies to the case of pri-
vately provided education in the next subsection. 
８．In this paper, human capital as well as unskilled
labor are actually “mobile ”between sectors. As we
know, if K had been so large or/and P had been so
small (i.e. relative price of final good 2 is so large),
sector 2 would have demanded more L hence UE
would have been so small and it would have ended
up a small amount of human capital. In extreme
case, specialization instead of diversification may
occur, just as in the case of Heckscher Ohlin model
where factors are mobile between factors. In the case
that both final good are produced, we must have
/ <K NP2 1+ t_ i . 
９．See argument in footnote 8. 
Trade Patterns and Human Capital under Publicly Provided Education and Privately Provided Education［CHONG Fatt Seng］
47
